CHAPTER XXIII COMMUNICATIVE TYPES OF SENTENCES

§ 1. The sentence is a communicative unit, therefore the primary classification of sentences must be based on the communicative principle. This principle is formulated in traditional grammar as the "purpose of communication".

The purpose of communication, by definition, refers to the sentence as a whole, and the structural features connected with the expression of this sentential function belong to the fundamental, constitutive qualities of the sentence as a lingual unit.

In accord with the purpose of communication three cardinal sentence-types have long been recognised in linguistic tradition: first, the declarative sentence; second, the imperative (inducive) sentence; third, the interrogative sentence. These communicative sentence-types stand in strict opposition to one another, and their inner properties of form and meaning are immediately correlated with the corresponding features of the listener's responses.

Thus, the declarative sentence expresses a statement, either affirmative or negative, and as such stands in systemic syntagmatic correlation with the listener's responding signals of attention, of appraisal (including agreement or disagreement), of fellow-feeling. Cf.:

"I think," he said, "that Mr. Desert should be asked to give us his reasons for publishing that poem." — "Hear, hear!" said the К. С. (J. Galsworthy). "We live very quietly here, indeed we do; my niece here will tell you the same." — "Oh, come, I'm not such a fool as that," answered the squire (D. du Maurier).

The imperative sentence expresses inducement, either affirmative or negative. That is, it urges the listener, in the form of request or command, to perform or not to perform a certain action. As such, the imperative sentence is situationally connected with the corresponding "action response" (Ch. Fries), and lingually is systemically correlated with a verbal response showing that the inducement is either complied with, or else rejected. Cf.:

"Let's go and sit down up there, Dinny." — "Very well" (J. Galsworthy). "Then marry me." — "Really, Alan, I never met anyone with so few ideas" (J. Galsworthy). "Send him back!" he said again. — "Nonsense, old chap" (J. Aldridge).

Since the communicative purpose of the imperative sentence is to make the listener act as requested, silence on the part of the latter (when the request is fulfilled), strictly speaking, is also linguistically relevant. This gap in speech, which situationally is filled in by the listener's action, is set off in literary narration by special comments and descriptions. Cf.:

"Knock on the wood." — Retan's man leaned forward and knocked three times on the barrera (E. Hemingway). "Shut the piano," whispered Dinny; "let's go up." — Diana closed the piano without noise and rose (J. Galsworthy).

The interrogative sentence expresses a question, i.e. a request for information wanted by the speaker from the listener. By virtue of this communicative purpose, the interrogative sentence is naturally connected with an answer, forming together with it a question-answer dialogue unity. Cf.:

"What do you suggest I should do, then?" said Mary helplessly. — "If I were you I should play a waiting game," he replied (D. du Maurier).

Naturally, in the process of actual communication the interrogative communicative purpose, like any other communicative task, may sporadically not be fulfilled. In case it is not fulfilled, the question-answer unity proves to be broken; instead of a needed answer the speaker is faced by silence on the part of the listener, or else he receives the latter's verbal rejection to answer. Cf.:

"Why can't you lay off?" I said to her. But she didn't even notice me (R. P. Warren). "Did he know about her?" — "You'd better ask him" (S. Maugham).

Evidently, such and like reactions to interrogative sentences are not immediately relevant in terms of environmental syntactic featuring.

§ 2. An attempt to revise the traditional communicative classification of sentences was made by the American scholar Ch. Fries who classed them, as a deliberate challenge to the

"accepted routine", not in accord with the purposes of communication, but according to the responses they elicit [Fries, 29-53].

In Fries's system, as a universal speech unit subjected to communicative analysis was chosen not immediately a sentence, but an utterance unit (a "free" utterance, i.e. capable of isolation) understood as a continuous chunk of talk by one speaker in a dialogue. The sentence was then defined as a minimum free utterance.

Utterances collected from the tape-recorded corpus of dialogues (mostly telephone conversations) were first classed into "situation utterances" (eliciting a response), and "response utterances". Situation single free utterances (i.e. sentences) were further divided into three groups:

1) Utterances that are regularly followed by oral responses only. These are greetings, calls, questions. E.g.:

Hello! Good-bye! See you soon!... Dad! Say, dear! Colonel Howard!... Have you got moved in? What are you going to do for the summer?...

2) Utterances regularly eliciting action responses. These are requests or commands. E.g.:

Read that again, will you? Oh, wait a minute! Please have him call Operator Six when he comes in! Will you see just exactly what his status is?

3) Utterances regularly eliciting conventional signals of attention to continuous discourse. These are statements. E.g.:

I've been talking with Mr. D — in the purchasing department about our type-writer. (—Yes?). That order went in March seventh. However it seems that we are about eighth on the list. (— I see). Etc.

Alongside of the described "communicative" utterances, i.e. utterances directed to a definite listener, another, minor type of utterances were recognised as not directed to any listener but, as Ch. Fries puts it, "characteristic of situations such as surprise, sudden pain, disgust, anger, laughter, sorrow" [Fries, 53]. E.g.: Oh, oh! Goodness! My God! Darn! Gosh! Etc.

Such and like interjectional units were classed by Ch. Fries as "noncommunicative" utterances.

Observing the given classification, it is not difficult to

see that, far from refuting or discarding the traditional classification of sentences built up on the principle of the "purpose of communication", it rather confirms and specifies it. Indeed, the very purpose of communication inherent in the addressing sentence is reflected in the listener's response. The second and third groups of Ch, Fries's "communicative" sentences-utterances are just identical imperative and declarative types both by the employed names and definition. As for the first group, it is essentially heterogeneous, which is recognised by the investigator himself, who distinguishes in its composition three communicatively different subgroups. One of these ("C") is constituted by "questions", i.e. classical interrogative sentences. The other two, viz. greetings ("A") and calls ("B"), are syntactically not cardinal, but, rather, minor intermediary types, making up the periphery of declarative sentences (greetings — statements of conventional goodwill at meeting and parting) and imperative sentences (calls — requests for attention). As regards "non-communicative" utterances — interjectional units, they are devoid of any immediately expressed intellective semantics, which excludes them from the general category of sentence as such (see further).

Thus, the undertaken analysis should, in point of fact, be looked upon as an actual application of the notions of communicative sentence-types to the study of oral speech, resulting in further specifications and development of these notions.

§ 3. Alongside of the three cardinal communicative sentence-types, another type of sentences is recognised in the theory of syntax, namely, the so-called exclamatory sentence. In modern linguistics it has been demonstrated that exclamatory sentences do not possess any complete set of qualities that could place them on one and the same level with the three cardinal communicative types of sentences. The property of exclamation should be considered as an accompanying feature which is effected within the system of the three cardinal communicative types of sentences.* In other words, each of the cardinal communicative sentence types can be represented in the two variants, viz. non-exclamatory and exclamatory. For instance, with the following

* See: Грамматика русского языка. М., 1960. Т, 2. Синтаксис, ч. I, с. 353; 365 и сл.

exclamatory sentences-statements it is easy to identify their non-exclamatory declarative prototypes:

What a very small cabin it was! (K. Mansfield) – It was a very small cabin. How utterly she had lost count of events! (J. Galsworthy) <– She had lost count of events. Why, if it isn't my lady! (J. Erskine) «— It is my lady.

Similarly, exclamatory questions are immediately related in the syntactic system to the corresponding non-exclamatory interrogative sentences. E.g.:

Whatever do you mean, Mr. Critchlow? (A. Bennett) «-What do you mean? Then why in God's name did you come? (K. Mansfield) «- Why did you come?

Imperative sentences, naturally, are characterised by a higher general degree of emotive intensity than the other two cardinal communicative sentence-types. Still, they form analogous pairs, whose constituent units are distinguished from each other by no other feature than the presence or absence of exclamation as such. E.g.:

Francis, will you please try to speak sensibly! (E. Hemingway) «- Try to speak sensibly. Don't you dare to compare me to common people! (B. Shaw) <— Don't compare me to common people. Never so long as you live say I made you do that! (J. Erskine) <— Don't say I made you do that.

As is seen from the given examples, all the three pairs of variant communicative types of sentences (non-exclamatory — exclamatory for each cardinal division) make up distinct semantico-syntactic oppositions effected by regular grammatical means of language, such as intonation, word-order and special constructions with functional-auxiliary lexemic elements. It follows from this that the functional-communicative classification of sentences specially distinguishing emotive factor should discriminate, on the lower level of analysis, between the six sentence-types forming, respectively, three groups (pairs) of cardinal communicative quality.

§ 4. The communicative properties of sentences can further be exposed in the light of the theory of actual division of the sentence.

The actual division provides for the informative content of the utterance to be expressed with the due gradation of

its parts according to the significance of their respective role in the context. But any utterance is formed within the framework of the system of communicative types of sentences. And as soon as we compare the communication-purpose aspect of the utterance with its actual division aspect we shall find that each communicative sentence type is distinguished by its specific actual division features, which are revealed first and foremost in the nature of the rheme as the meaningful nucleus of the utterance.

The strictly declarative sentence immediately expresses a certain proposition. By virtue of this, the actual division of the declarative sentence presents itself in the most developed and complete form. The rheme of the declarative sentence makes up the centre of some statement as such. This can be distinctly demonstrated by a question-test directly revealing the rhematic part of an utterance. Cf.: The next instant she had recognised him. → What had she done the next instant?

The pronominal what -question clearly exposes in the example the part "(had) recognised him" as the declarative rheme, for this part is placed within the interrogative-pronominal reference. In other words, the tested utterance with its completed actual division is the only answer to the cited potential question; the utterance has been produced by the speaker just to express the fact of "his being recognised".

Another transformational test for the declarative rheme is the logical superposition. The logical superposition consists in transforming the tested construction into the one where the rheme is placed in the position of the logically emphasised predicate. By way of example let us take the second sentence in the following sequence: And I was very uneasy. All sorts of forebodings assailed me.

The logical superposition of the utterance is effected thus: → What assailed me was all sorts of forebodings.

This test marks out the subject of the utterance "all sorts of forebodings" as the rheme, because it is just this part of the utterance that is placed in the emphatic position of the predicate in the superpositional transform.

Similar diagnostic procedures expose the layer-structure of the actual division in composite syntactic constructions. For instance, in the following complex sentence rhematic question-tests easily reveal the three declarative rhemes on the three consecutive syntactic layers: I knew that Mr, Wade had been very excited by something that he had found out.

Test for the first syntactic layer: What did I know?

Test for the second syntactic layer: What state was Mr. Wade in?

Test for the third syntactic layer: What made him excited? (By what was he excited?)

The strictly imperative sentence, as different from the strictly declarative sentence, does not express by its immediate destination any statement of fact, i.e. any proposition proper. It is only based on a proposition, without formulating it directly. Namely, the proposition underlying the imperative sentence is reversely contrasted against the content of the expressed inducement, since an urge to do something (affirmative inducement) is founded on the premise that something is not done or is otherwise not affected by the wanted action, and, conversely, an urge not to do something (negative inducement) is founded on the directly opposite premise. Cf.:

Let's go out at once! (The premise: We are in.) Never again take that horrible woman into your confidence, Jerry! (The premise: Jerry has taken that horrible woman into his confidence.)

Thus, the rheme of the imperative utterance expresses the informative nucleus not of an explicit proposition, but of an inducement — a wanted (or unwanted) action together with its referential attending elements (objects, qualities, circumstances).

Due to the communicative nature of the inducement addressed to the listener, its thematic subject is usually zeroed, though it can be represented in the form of direct address. Cf.:

Don't try to sidetrack me (J. Braine). Put that dam* dog down, Fleur; I can't see your face (J. Galsworthy). Kindly tell me what you meant, Wilfrid (J. Galsworthy).

Inducements that include in the address also the speaker himself, or are directed, through the second person medium, to a third person (persons) present their thematic subjects explicit in the construction. E.g.:

I say, Bob, let's try to reconstruct the scene as it developed. Please don't let's quarrel over the speeds now. Let her produce the document if she has it.

The whole composition of an ordinary imperative utterance is usually characterised by a high informative value,

17—1499 257

so that the rheme proper, or the informative peak, may stand here not so distinctly against the background information as in the declarative utterance. Still, rhematic testing of imperative utterances does disclose the communicative stratification of their constituents. Compare the question-tests of a couple of the cited examples:

Put that dam' dog down, Fleur. → What is Fleur to do with the dog? Kindly tell me what you meant, Wilfrid. → What is Wilfrid to tell the speaker?

As for the thematic, and especially the subrhematic (transitional) elements of the imperative utterance, they often are functionally charged with the type-grading of inducement itself,–i.e.-with making it into a command, prohibition, request, admonition, entreaty, etc. Compare, in addition to the cited, some more examples to this effect:

Let us at least remember to admire each other (L. Hellman). Oh, please stop it... Please, please stop it (E. Hemingway). Get out before I break your dirty little neck (A. Hailey).

The second-person inducement may include the explicit pronominal subject, but such kind of constructions should be defined as of secondary derivation. They are connected with a complicated informative content to be conveyed to the listener-performer, expressing, on the one hand, the choice of the subject out of several persons-participants of the situation, and on the other hand, appraisals rendering various ethical connotations (in particular, the type-grading of inducement mentioned above). Cf.:

"What about me?" she asked. — "Nothing doing. You go to bed and sleep" (A. Christie). Don't you worry about me, sir. I shall be all right (B..K. Seymour).

At a further stage of complication, the subject of the inducement may be shifted to the position of the rheme. E.g.:

"...We have to do everything we can." — "You do it," he said. "I'm tired" (E. Hemingway).

The essentially different identifications of the rheme in the two imperative utterances of the cited example can be proved by transformational testing:... → What we have to do is (to do) everything we can.... → The person who should do it is you.

The inducement with the rhematic subject of the latter

type may be classed as the "(informatively) shifted inducement".

§ 5. As far as the strictly interrogative sentence is concerned, its actual division is uniquely different from the actual division of both the declarative and the imperative sentence-types.

The unique quality of the interrogative actual division is determined by the fact that the interrogative sentence, instead of conveying some relatively self-dependent content, expresses an inquiry about information which the speaker (as a participant of a typical question-answer situation) does not possess. Therefore the rheme of the interrogative sentence, as the nucleus of the inquiry, is informationally open (gaping); its function consists only in marking the rhematic position in the response sentence and programming the content of its filler in accord with the nature of the inquiry.

Different types of questions present different types of open rhemes.

In the pronominal ("special") question, the nucleus of inquiry is expressed by an interrogative pronoun. The pronoun is immediately connected with the part of the sentence denoting the object or phenomenon about which the inquiry ("condensed" in the pronoun) is made. The gaping pronominal meaning is to be replaced in the answer by the wanted actual information. Thus, the rheme of the answer is the reverse substitute of the interrogative pronoun: the two make up a rhematic unity in the broader question-answer construction. As for the thematic part of the answer, it is already expressed in the question, therefore in common speech it is usually zeroed. E.g.:

"Why do you think so?" — "Because mostly I keep my eyes open, miss, and I talk to people" (A. Hailey).

The superpositional rhematic test for the pronominal question may be effected in the following periphrastic-definitional form: —» The question about your thinking so is: why?

For the sake of analytical convenience this kind of superposition may be reduced as follows: → You think so — why?

Compare some more pronominal interrogative superpositions:

What happens to a man like Hawk Harrap as the years go by? (W. Saroyan). → To a man like Hawk Harrap, as

the years go by — what happens? How do you make that out, mother? (E. M. Forster) → You make that out, mother, — how? How's the weather in the north? (D. du Maurier) → The weather in the north — how is it? What's behind all this? (A. Hailey) → Behind all this is — what?

The rheme of non-pronominal questions is quite different from the one described. It is also open, but its openness consists in at least two semantic suggestions presented for choice to the listener. The choice is effected in the response; in other words, the answer closes the suggested alternative according to the interrogative-rhematic program inherent in it. This is clearly seen in the structure of ordinary, explicit alternative questions. E.g.: Will you take it away or open it here? (Th. Dreiser)

The superposition of the utterance may be presented as follows: →You in relation to it — will take (it) away, will open (it) here?

The alternative question may have a pronominal introduction, emphasising the open character of its rheme. Cf.: In which cave is the offence alleged, the Buddhist or the Jain? (E. M. Forster)

The superposition: → The offence is alleged — in the Buddhist cave, in the Jain cave?

Thus, in terms of rhematic reverse substitution, the pronominal question is a question of unlimited substitution choice, while the alternative question is a question of a limited substitution choice, the substitution of the latter kind being, as a rule, expressed implicitly. This can be demonstrated by a transformation applied to the first of the two cited examples of alternative questions: Will you take it away or open it here? → Where will you handle it — take it away or open it here?

The non-pronominal question requiring either confirmation or negation ("general" question of yes-no response type) is thereby implicitly alternative, though the inquiry inherent in it concerns not the choice between some suggested facts, but the choice between the existence or non-existence of an indicated fact. In other words, it is a question of realised rhematic substitution (or of "no substitution choice"), but with an open existence factor (true to life or not true to life?), which makes up its implicitly expressed alternative. This can be easily shown by a superposition; Are they going to stay long? → They are going to stay — long, not long?

The implicit alternative question can be made into an explicit one, which as a rule is very emphatic, i.e. stylistically "forced". The negation in the implied alternative part is usually referred to the verb. Cf.: →Are they going to stay long, or are they not going to stay long?

The cited relation of this kind of question to interrogative reverse substitution (and, together with it, the open character of its rheme) is best demonstrated by the corresponding pronominal transformation: → How long are they going to stay — long (or not long)?

As we see, the essential difference between the two types of alternative questions, the explicit one and the implicit one, remains valid even if the latter is changed into an explicit alternative question (i.e. into a stylistically forced explicit alternative question). This difference is determined by the difference in the informative composition of the interrogative constructions compared.

In general terms of meaning, the question of the first type (the normal explicit alternative question) should be classed as the alternative question of fact, since a choice between two or more facts is required by it; the question of the second type (the implicit alternative question) should be classed as the alternative question of truth, since it requires the statement of truth or non-truth of the indicated fact. In terms of actual division, the question of the first type should be classed as the polyperspective alternative question (biperspective, triperspective, etc.), because it presents more than one informative perspectives (more than one actual divisions) for the listener's choice; the question of the second type, as opposed to the polyperspective, should be classed as the monoperspective alternative question, because its both varieties (implicit and explicit) express only one informative perspective, which is presented to the listener for the existential yes-no appraisal.

§ 6. The exposition of the fundamental role of actual division in the formation of the communicative sentence types involves, among other things, the unequivocal refutation of recognising by some linguists the would-be "purely exclamatory sentence" that cannot be reduced to any of the three demonstrated cardinal communicative types.*

* The existence of the "purely exclamatory sentence" is defended, in particular, by B. A. Ilyish in his cited book (pp. 186-187).

Indeed, by "purely exclamatory sentences" are meant no other things than interjectional exclamations of ready-made order such as "Great Heavens!", "Good Lord!", "For God's sake!" "Fiddle-dee-dee!", "Oh, I say!" and the like, which, due to various situational conditions, find themselves in self-dependent, proposemically isolated positions in the text. Cf.:

"Oh, for God's sake!" — "Oh, for God's sake!" the boy had repeated (W. Saroyan). "Ah!" said Lady Mont. "That reminds me" (J. Galsworthy).

As is seen from the examples, the isolated positions of the interjectional utterances do not make them into any meaningfully articulate, grammatically predicated sentences with their own informative perspective (either explicit, or implicit). They remain not signals of proposemically complete thoughts, not "communicative utterances" (see above), but mere symptoms of emotions, consciously or unconsciously produced shouts of strong feelings. Therefore the highest rank that they deserve in any relevant linguistic classification of "single free units of speech" is "non-sentential utterances" (which is just another name for Ch. Fries's "noncommunicative utterances").

Of quite another nature are exclamatory sentences with emphatic introducers derived on special productive syntactic patterns. Cf.:

Oh, that Mr. Thornspell hadn't been so reserved! How silly of you! If only I could raise the necessary sum! Etc.

These constructions also express emotions, but they are meaningfully articulate and proposemically complete. They clearly display a definite nominative composition which is predicated, i.e. related to reality according to the necessary grammatical regularities. And they inevitably belong to quite a definite communicative type of sentences, namely, to the declarative type.

§ 7. The vast set of constructional sentence models possessed by language is formed not only by cardinal, mono-functional communicative types; besides these, it includes also intermediary predicative constructions distinguished by mixed communicative features. The true nature of such intermediary constructions can be disclosed in the light of the

actual division theory combined with the general theory of paradigmatic oppositions.

Observations conducted on the said principles show that intermediary communicative sentence models may be identified between all the three cardinal communicative correlations (viz., statement — question, statement — inducement, inducement — question); they have grown and are sustained in language as a result of the transference of certain characteristic features from one communicative type of sentences to another.

§ 8. In the following dialogue sequence the utterance which is declarative by its formal features, at the same time contains a distinct pronominal question:

" I wonder why they come to me about it. That's your job, sweetheart." — I looked up from Jasper, my face red as fire. "Darling," I said, "I meant to tell you before, but — but I forgot" (D. du Maurier).

Semantic-syntactic comparison of the two utterances produced by the participants of the cited dialogue clearly shows in the initial utterance the features inherently peculiar to the interrogative communicative type, namely, its open rhematic part ("why they come to me about it") and the general programming character of its actual division in relation to the required response.

Compare some more examples of a similar nature:

"But surely I may treat him as a human being." — "Most certainly not" (B. Shaw), "I don't disturb you, I hope, Mr Cokane." — "By no means" (B. Shaw). "Wait a second, you haven't told me your address." — "Oh, I'm staying at the Hotel du Phare" (A. Christie), "I should like to hear your views on that," replied Utterson (R. L. Stevenson).

As is seen from the examples, utterances intermediary between statements and questions convey meanings and connotations that supplement the direct programming of the answer effected by strictly monofunctional, cardinal interrogative constructions. Namely, they render the connotation of insistency in asking for information, they express a more definite or lass definite supposition of the nature of information possessed by the listener, they present a suggestion to

the listener to perform a certain action or imply a request for permission to perform an action, etc.

On the other hand, in the structural framework of the interrogative sentence one can express a statement. This type of utterance is classed as the "rhetorical question" — an expressive construction that has been attracting the closest attention of linguistic observers since ancient times.

A high intensity of declarative functional meaning expressed by rhetorical questions is best seen in various proverbs and maxims based on this specifically emphatic predicative unit. Cf.:

Can a leopard change his spots? Can man be free if woman be a slave? O shame! Where is thy blush? Why ask the Bishop when the Pope's around? Who shall decide when the doctors disagree?

Compare rhetorical questions in stylistically freer, more common forms of speech:

That was my mission, you imagined. It was not, but where was I to go? (O. Wilde) That was all right; I meant what I said. Why should I feel guilty about it? (J. Braine) How could I have ever thought I could get away with it! (J. Osborne)

It should be noted that in living speech responses to rhetorical questions exactly correspond to responses elicited by declarative sentences: they include signals of attention, appraisals, expressions of fellow feeling, etc. Cf.:

"How can a woman be expected to be happy with a man who insists on treating her as if she were a perfectly rational being?" — "My dear!" (O. Wilde)

A rhetorical question in principle can be followed by a direct answer, too. However, such an answer does not fill up the rheme of the rhetorical question (which, as different from the rheme of a genuine question, is not at all open), but emphatically accentuates its intensely declarative semantic nature. An answer to a rhetorical question also emphasises its affirmative or negative implication which is opposite to the formal expression of affirmation or negation in the outer structure of the question. Cf.: "What more can a gentleman desire in this world?" — "Nothing more, I am quite sure" (O. Wilde).

Due to these connotations, the answer to a rhetorical

question can quite naturally be given by the speaker himself: Who, being in love, is poor? Oh, no one (O. Wilde).

The declarative nature of the rhetorical question is revealed also in the fact that it is not infrequently used as an answer to a genuine question — namely, in cases when an expressive, emphatic answer is needed. Cf.: "Do you expect to save the country, Mr Mangan?" — "Well, who else will?" (B. Shaw)

Rhetorical questions as constructions of intermediary communicative nature should be distinguished from such genuine questions as are addressed by the speaker to himself in the process of deliberation and reasoning. The genuine quality of the latter kind of questions is easily exposed by observing the character of their rhematic elements. E.g.: Had she had what was called a complex all this time? Or was love always sudden like this? A wild flower seeding on a wild wind? (J. Galsworthy)

The cited string of questions belongs to the inner speech of a literary personage presented in the form of non-personal direct speech. The rhemes of the questions are definitely open, i.e. they are typical of ordinary questions in a dialogue produced by the speaker with an aim to obtain information from his interlocutor. This is clearly seen from the fact that the second question presents an alternative in relation to the first question; as regards the third question, it is not a self-dependent utterance, but a specification, cumulatively attached to the foregoing construction.

Genuine questions to oneself as part of monologue deliberations can quite naturally be followed by corresponding responses, forming various kinds of dialogue within monologue. Cf.:

Was she tipsy, week-minded, or merely in love? Perhaps all three! (J. Galsworthy). My God! What shall I do? I dare not tell her who this woman really is. The shame would kill her (O. Wilde).

§ 9. The next pair of correlated communicative sentence types between which are identified predicative constructions of intermediary nature are declarative and imperative sentences.

The expression of inducement within the framework of a declarative sentence is regularly achieved by means of constructions with modal verbs. E.g.:

You ought to get rid of it, you know (C. P. Snow). "You can't come in," he said. "You mustn't get what I have" (E. Hemingway). Well, you must come to me now for anything you want, or I shall be quite cut up (J. Galsworthy). "You might as well sit down," said Javotte (J. Erskine).

Compare semantically more complex constructions in which the meaning of inducement is expressed as a result of interaction of different grammatical elements of an utterance with its notional lexical elements:

"And if you'll excuse me, Lady Eileen, I think it's time you were going back to bed." The firmness of his tone admitted of no parley (A. Christie). If you have anything to say to me, Dr Trench, I will listen to you patiently. You will then allow me to say what I have to say on my part (B. Shaw).

Inducive constructions, according to the described general tendency, can be used to express a declarative meaning complicated by corresponding connotations. Such utterances are distinguished by especially high expressiveness and intensity. E.g.: The Forsyte in him said: "Think, feel, and you're done for!" (J. Galsworthy)

Due to its expressiveness this kind of declarative inducement, similar to rhetorical questions, is used in maxims and proverbs. E.g.:

Talk of the devil and he will appear. Roll my log and I will roll yours. Live and learn. Live and let live.

Compare also corresponding negative statements of the formal imperative order: Don't count your chickens before they are hatched. Don't cross the bridge till you get to it.

§ 10. Imperative and interrogative sentences make up the third pair of opposed cardinal communicative sentence types serving as a frame for intermediary communicative patterns.

Imperative sentences performing the essential function of interrogative sentences are such as induce the listener not to action, but to speech. They may contain indirect questions. E.g.:

"Tell me about your upbringing." — "I should like to hear about yours" (E. J. Howard). "Please tell me what I can do. There must be something I can do." — "You can take the leg off and that might stop it..." (E. Hemingway).

The reverse intermediary construction, i.e. inducement effected in the form of question, is employed in order to convey such additional shades of meaning as request, invitation, suggestion, softening of a command, etc. E.g.:

"Why don't you get Aunt Em to sit instead, Uncle? She's younger than I am any day, aren't you, Auntie?" (J. Galsworthy) "Would — would you like to come?" — "I would," said Jimmy heartily. "Thanks ever so much, Lady Coote" (A. Christie).

Additional connotations in inducive utterances having the form of questions may be expressed by various modal constructions. E.g.:

Can I take you home in a cab? (W. Saroyan) "Could you tell me," said Dinny, "of any place close by where I could get something to eat?" (J. Galsworthy) I am really quite all right. Perhaps you will help me up the stairs? (A. Christie)

In common use is the expression of inducement effected in the form of a disjunctive question. The post-positional interrogative tag imparts to the whole inducive utterance a more pronounced or less pronounced shade of a polite request or even makes it into a pleading appeal. Cf.:

Find out tactfully what he wants, will you? (J. Tey) And you will come too, Basil, won't you? (O. Wilde)

§ 11. The undertaken survey of lingual facts shows that the combination of opposite cardinal communicative features displayed by communicatively intermediary sentence patterns is structurally systemic and functionally justified. It is justified because it meets quite definite expressive requirements. And it is symmetrical in so far as each cardinal communicative sentence type is characterised by the same tendency of functional transposition in relation to the two other communicative types opposing it. It means that within each of the three cardinal communicative oppositions two different intermediary communicative sentence models are established, so that at a further level of specification, the communicative classification of sentences should be expanded by six subtypes of sentences of mixed communicative features. These are, first, mixed sentence patterns of declaration (interrogative-declarative, imperative-declarative); second, mixed sentence patterns of interrogation (declarative-interrogative, imperative-interrogative); third,

mixed sentence-patterns of inducement (declarative-imperative, interrogative-imperative). All the cited intermediary communicative types of sentences belong to living, productive syntactic means of language and should find the due reflection both in theoretical linguistic description and in practical language teaching.

Поиск по сайту: