NEP: Flappers and Foxtrotters

By the end of civil war the Soviet government was in a difficult situation. Despite of its victory the methods of militarized economy, such as grain requisitioning, lost them the support of the people. This culminated in the famine of 1921 and finally the Kronstadt mutiny of 1921, the most alarming threat (Oxley, 2001, p 35). As a result Lenin decided to “let the peasants have their little bit of capitalism as long as we keep the power” and introduced the New Economic policy, which ended grain requisitioning, allowed free markets and small businesses (Temin, Johnson, 1993).

Gorsuch (1992), a key scholar in the field of Soviet Cultural History, highlights the NEP as the main cause for the emergence of the bourgeois temptations. The fact that most of her works are dedicated to the topic of post-revolutionary youth culture adds value to her arguments as she has gained considerable insight into the topic. Moreover, as an academic the purpose of her investigation is to add new knowledge to the field so it is impartial in tone and reliable. Also she was writing after the perestroika so the availability of primary sources has increased.

The NEP unintentionally created all necessary socio-political preconditions needed for their existence of the youth subcultures. Firstly, the allowance of private enterprise led to a creation of a new class of entrepreneurs, the NEPman. It was their children, ‘The Golden Youth’, which had the necessary resources to buy the fashionable Western attires in secret underground shops of Moscow and Saint-Petersburg. The movement than however, spread onto the factory youth, as they too got exposed to the beauty of the western lifestyle through cinema and their living standards improved.

The NEP is also to blame for the existence of non-Soviet forms of expression and non-Soviet ideas. This happened because pragmatism of the economic policy outweighed the considerations for its social consequences. Gorsuch highlights the “cultural confusion” and the mixed social messages of the NEP. Specific examples of contradictions are that Komsomol educators told youth to spend their time reading books about Lenin and watching movies about the Revolution, while the NEP allowed the bourgeois capitalist culture to function within the country and sometimes even fostered it. For example, the Komsomol condemned Hollywood movies, which promoted non-Soviet forms of behaviour such as dancing and drinking, while they were available throughout 1920s and even sponsored by governmental agencies, which needed the revenue to create their own propagandist movies (Gorsuch, 1992). This is supported by data as out of all new movies shown in 1926, 128 were foreign, while 105 were Soviet (Gorsuch, 1992, p 192). This was particularly important as movies were the most popular form of entertainment for the Russian youth of 1920s. For instance, 50% of Kharkov’s and 80% Moscow’s youth went to the cinema at least once a week (Godderham, 1992, p. 550). Furthermore, the number of cinemas in Petrograd doubled between 1922 and 1925, and the estimated number of the audiences quadrupled (Godderham, 1982). This shows how much exposure to the western culture the youth had. Another example of a contradiction is that western-like fashion magazines, which inspired young Flappers to follow the forbidden fashion, were openly published in Moscow and not closed down. Moreover, the “Russian lipstick” that girls were still able to buy by the end of the 1920s was condemned as a “ bourgeois vice” but was produced by a government monopoly, because the popularity of the product made it so profitable (Gorsuch, 1992). Moreover, the cultural effect of the American Relief Administration[13] is evident along with the grain for the starving and food packages, the young American Relief workers brought the fox-trot to Russia (Gorsuch, 1994) This is also supported by the primary source of K.Golicin’s memoirs, where he remembers that ARA allowed Russian to meet Americans for the first time (1997). This environment, full of contradictions and temptation, is from my point of view, the main reason for the rise of the alternative youth culture during the NEP.

It is also evident that the Komsomol was unable to control or interest youth. According to a survey carried out in 1923 around 20% of its members were purged for the reasons of ill-behaviour, proving it’s ineffectiveness in the imposition of Soviet values even within its members (Godderham, 1982, p 550).

However an environment is not enough for a particular subculture to emerge, there also must be a motivating factor, which pushes young people to take the risk of being different. This factor was the difficulty of reality and the puritanical images of perfect socialist youth imposed by the Komsomol. For example, the Komsomol enthusiasts promoted extreme cultural ascetism. They regarded even a necktie or a clean blouse as unrevolutionary (1992, Gorsuch, p 195). Generally, the dedicated Komsomolets, who just came from fighting in the Civil war, had a very extreme ‘avant-gardist’ stance on stamping out all bourgeois traits and creating a perfect socialist utopia they were willing to die for. Furthermore, many young people were surrounded by difficult living conditions: for example by 1923 there was approximately one million of urban youth aged 14-17 unemployed and not in education (Gorsuch, 1993, p 196). Moreover, Komsomol sow the role of movies as purely educational and thus the topics of movies shown at schools and youth clubs included Civil War, homeless youth and social problems such as abortion. Therefore, it is not surprising that a large proportion of both working and middle class youth turned to the escapist qualities of Western movies and dress, which “evoked dreams of adventurous and carefree life far removed from the daily burdens of revolutionary Russia “(Gorsuch, 1992,p 190).By imitating Western-like clothes soviet youth hoped to adopt “some of the modern independence chic and sophistication associated with flapper fashion”(Godderham,1982, p 507).Also, according to the memoirs of Kyniaz[14] K.Golicin,who was in his twenties when the NEP was established, the youth was simply hungry for better life and fun, which the hard post –revolutionary years could not provide and had no ulterior motivation for political or social protest(1997).Therefore, the youth simply wanted to make full use of the new opportunities NEP provided, be that dress, music or dance. However, although Golicin was a contemporary his memoir (which makes the source valuable in representing the views at the time), it only reflects the motivation of his social circle[15] and is merely based on his observations. Thus it doesn’t explain the motivations of the lower- class youth. Its purpose is not to give an overall judgment of the period but rather to recall his personal experiences as a member of the disappearing noble class.

Gorsuch also considers the devaluation of the working class soviet culture and the desire for upward social mobility of the 1920s youth (1994). Evidence of that can be seen in the willingness of some youngsters to reproduce aristocratic manners and even in their gender-relations. For instance many factory girls, who followed the flapper fashion refused to go out with working class boys just like fashionable working-class boys preferred the daughters of the wealthy NEPman as their partners (Gorsuch, 1992).

Поиск по сайту: