The Scientist as a Practical Reason er

From what we have said earlier, it is clear that the question of how scientists produce and reproduce their knowledge refers us to the site of scientific action. It prompts us to

The Scientist as a Practical Reasoner 21

look (and as closely as possible) at the process of manufacture of knowledge on the spot. In other words, we must dismiss the battery of intermediary tools normally used to negotiate with social reality, and immerse ourselves directly in the stream of scien­tific action.

Strictly speaking, it is not really scientific action we have to confront in direct obser­vation, but the savage meaning on ongoing events for and by the scientists. To get at this meaning, we must rely on talk. Without it, not even prolonged visits to the laboratory and training in the discipline at stake will make the rationale behind laboratory moves apparent. As I have said before, scientists operate in a space that is essentially overdetermined. The major task of the laboratory is to rule out possibilities, manipulate the balance of choices so that one becomes more attractive than the others, and to up- or downgrade variables with respect to alternatives.

An understanding of these processes cannot be gained from observation alone. We must also listen to the talk about what happens, the asides and the curses, the mutter-ings of exasperation, the questions they ask each other, the formal discussions and lunch-time chats. We must read the laboratory protocol books and rely on answers supplied by the scientists. For the scientist, the savage meaning of things is contained in their laboratory reasoning; and the talk which centres around this reasoning must be our major source of information.

The closest we can get to a description of the formal features of this reasoning is to draw upon Alfred Schutz' conceptual clarification, found in Garfinkel's work on the rational properties of (symbolic) action.⁷⁶ However, it would be misleading to take this clarification at face value, because it presupposes a difference between scientific and everyday reasoning which I do not accept. Garfinkel suggests that there are in fact two kinds of rationalities: those which occur as "stable properties and sanctionable ideals" of scientific action alone, and those which occur in everyday life. The former are con­sidered detrimental to the stable flow of everyday practical action.

The five rules of interpretive procedure which characterise scientific reasoning are constituted in contrast to everyday reasoning. The rule of unlimited doubt, for exam­ple, guarantees that scientists will not limit their scepticism by the kind of "practical considerations" which govern everday practice. The rule of "knowing nothing" allows scientists to suspend their own knowledge in order "to see where it leads", while testing in everyday life proceeds on the basis of what can be taken for granted. Scientific prob­lems are solved by reference to a rule of standard time, while everyday interactions are paced in accord with reified time slices that have a beginning, duration, and end. A rule of universalised others offers the scientist a chance to trust the findings of colleagues, while practical action supposedly gains credence from the natural facts of life. Finally, a rule of publicisability assures that all matters relevant to scientific depictions of pos­sible worlds are made public, whereas everyday situations are conceived against a background of private motives and interests.

Except for the principle of standard time, these rules are surprisingly similar to the norms of organised scepticism, disinterestedness and communism that Merton once postulated for science—and are subject to the same kind of criticism.⁷⁷ More relevant than this attempt to identify the scientific ethic with a specific form of reasoning is Gar­finkel's summary of the unspecific properties of common sense rationalities, for these are what we actually find in laboratory reasoning. Among these are a concern for mak­ing things comparable, for a "good fit" between observation and interpretation, for

22 The Manufacture of Knowledge

timing, predictability and correct procedures; a search for previously successful means, a conscious analysis of the alternatives and consequences of action; an interest in the planning of strategies; and an awareness of choices, as well as the grounds upon which these choices can be made.

But a complete characterisation of the formal properties of laboratory reasoning is not the point here. In fact, part of the thrust of this book is to demonstrate that there are no rationalities unique to laboratory action. The formal features of reasoning show the scientist to be a practical reasoner. Therefore, to examine the meanings which sus­tain the manufacture of knowledge in the laboratory is to look at the content of the scientists' practical reasoning.

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