Managerial Salaries

The managerial and higher technical personnel of a Soviet industrial enterprise receive monthly salaries. The levels of these are fixed by the state, and vary according to qualifications, the size and position of the enterprise etc.:

"Individual monthly salaries are set for executives, engineering and technical personnel... The state fixes salary differentials depending on the importance of an economic sector, enterprise or shop, on working conditions, the area in which an enterprise is located, and so on. In addition, the amount of salary always depends on the volumeof work at the enterprise etc., degree of responsibility and complexity of the production process.

Specially well-qualified executives or engineers employed in major sections of an enterprise, office or organisation receive personal salaries not, as a rule, exceeding the normal salary by more than half".

(Y.L. Manevich: "Wages Systems", in: "The Soviet Planned Economy"; Moscow; 1974; p. 251-2).

In describing industry in orthodox capitalist countries, Soviet sociologists draw attention to:

"... the' key position' of the foreman in bringing ideological influence to bear on workers".

(N. Bogomolova: "Human Relations Doctrine: Ideological Weapon of the Monopolies"; Moscow; 1973; p. 83).

In the Soviet Union also, however, since the "economic reform", the role of the foreman in an industrial enterprise has been raised from that of (in Marx's words) "non-commissioned officer" to that of full member of management, with appropriate increase in his wage-level:

"Top administrative personnel.. include, first and foremost, the director, production shop chiefs and foremen".

(S. Kamenitser: "The Experience of Industrial Management in the Soviet Union"; Moscow; 1975; p. 65).

"It has long been suggested that the foreman be given more responsibility and higher wages.. Since the foreman now contributes more to production, directors now have the right to raise the wages of highly skilled foremen and technical personnel in order to provide an additional incentive, this increase amounting to up to 30% of their fixed salaries, to be paid out of the planned wages fund".

(A. Volkov; "Profit and Personal Incentive", in: "Pravda" (Truth), November 14th., 1965, in; "The Soviet Economic Reform: Main Features and Aims"; Moscow; 1967; p. 97).

On the shop floor the most highly skilled grade of worker receives a wage twice that of the least skilled grade:

"At present one scale of rates is in operation in every sector. Most enterprises have a scale which consists of six grades with a ratio between the higher and lower of 1:2".

(Y.L. Manevich: ibid.; p. 242-3).

The monthly salaries of managerial and technical personnel are naturally higher than the wages of the average shop-floor worker:

"A foreman's salary in a top-category section is 10-20% higher than the basic wage rate for a highly qualified worker; the salary of a foreman in the lowest 3rd. group is 10-20% higher than the basic wage rate for average-qualified workers in this section.... Shop superintendents in the higher group in all sectors are paid more than twice as much as a foreman in the lowest group. The salary paid to an enterprise manager (director) is never more than treble the salary of a foreman. The chief engineer's salary is 85-100% that of the director".

(Y.L. Manevich: ibid.; p. 252).

On this basis, the salaries of managerial and higher technical personnel bear the following relationship to the basic wage rate of an average shop floor worker:

Average shop floor worker 1.5 units

Foreman 1.6 to 2.4 units

Shop superintendent (more than) 3.2 units

Chief engineer (up to) 4.1 to 7.2 units

Director (up to) 4.8 to 7.2 units

Specially well-qualified director (up to) 7.2 to 10.8 units

That is, the salary of an enterprise director is up to 7.2 times the basic wage of a shop floor worker of average skill.

This wage/salary differential between shop floor workers and management personnel forms, however, only a minor part of the actual income differential between these categories; the greater part of the latter, as will be demonstrated, accrues from differentials in "bonus payments".

14: "Price Control"

According to Marx, of whom contemporary Soviet economists claim to be disciples, the value of a commodity is determined by the amount of socially necessary labour involved in its production:

"That which determines the magnitude of the value of any article is the amount of labour socially necessary... for its production".

(K. Marx: "Capital", Volume 1; London; 1974; p. 47).

A market is an area where prospective buyers and sellers of a commodity are in contact.

The price of a commodity is the amount of money for which its prospective vendor is willing to sell it in a particular market at a particular time.

In a market where prospective buyers and sellers of a commodity are in competition with one another, the price of that commodity fluctuates around its value -- above or below it -- according to the relation between supply of and effective demand for that commodity in the market:

"Their (i.e., commodities' -- WBB) value is the centre of gravity around which their prices fluctuate.... If supply equals demand.. commodities are sold at their market values....The relation of demand and supply... explains the deviations of market prices from market values".

(K. Marx: ibid., Volume 3; p. 178, 189, 190).

Contemporary Soviet propagandists claim than Stalin "denied the operation of the law of value in a socialist economy":

"It is well known that the operation of the law of value in the socialist economy was generally denied for a long time with the blessing of Stalin".

(L. Gatovsky: "The Role of Profit in a Socialist Economy", in: "Kommunist" (Communist), No. 18, 1962, in: M.E. Sharpe (Ed.): "Planning, Profit and Incentives in the USSR", Volume 1; New York: 1966; p. 95).

This claim is untrue. Stalin is on record as saying:

"It is sometimes asked whether the law of value exists and operates in our country, under the socialist system.

Yes, it does exist and does operate. Wherever commodities and commodity production exist, there the law of value must also exist".

(J.V. Stalin: "Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR"; Moscow; 1952; p. 23).

What, in fact, these propagandists mean by saying that Stalin "denied the operation of the law of value" under socialism is that, during the period when a socialist society existed in the Soviet Union, the price of a commodity was often fixed by the state at a radically different level from its value:

"At that time the approach to price itself was voluntaristic. Price was artificially divorced from its objective basis -- value",

(L. Gatovsky: ibid.; p. 95).

or, in other words, the operation of the law of value was strictly limited:

"The law of value exercises its influence on production.....But.. the sphere of operation of the law of value under our economic system is strictly limited and placed within definite bounds".

(J.V. Stalin: ibid.; p. 23, 25).

Under the socialist system which formerly existed in the Soviet Union, the prices of commodities were fixed at all levels by the state. In fixing the price of a commodity, its value was taken into account, but the actual price was determined in accordance with the state's assessment of social requirements. Thus, over a considerable period the price of vodka was fixed above its value in order to discourage its consumption; on the other hand, the price of clothing was fixed below its value in order to assist the working people to buy more clothes. As a result of this price-fixing policy, enterprises in the vodka industry made an above-average rate of profit, while enterprises in the clothing industry made a below-average rate of profit. But since virtually all the profits of all industries accrued to the state and not to the individual enterprises, this was of book-keeping significance only.

As in the case of production assets, the rate of profit made by an enterprise -- defined since the "economic reform" as "the supreme criterion of the efficiency of an enterprise" -- could become a reality and function as the regulator of social production only if this "voluntaristic" method of fixing prices was abolished and prices were brought into line with values.

In the propaganda campaign preceding and associated with the "economic reform", therefore, the demand was put forward that the prices of commodities should be brought as closely as possible into line with their values, i.e., with the amount of socially necessary labour necessary for their production:

"Prices must, to a growing extent, reflect the socially necessary outlay of labour".

("Programme of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union"; Moscow; 1961; p. 83).

"Prices at which an enterprise sells its output shoud be based on the socially necessary labour outlays".

(L. Gatovsky: ibid,; p. 91).

"Price must reflect the sum total of the socially necessary input of labour into the manufacture of the product".

(L. Leontiev: "The Plan and Methods of Economic Management", in "Pravda" (Truth), September 7th., 1964, in: M.E. Sharpe (Ed.): op. cit., Volume 1; p. 211).

"Prices must increasingly reflect socially necessary outlays of labour".

(A.N. Kosygin: "On Improving Industrial Management, Perfecting Planning and Enhancing Economic Incentives in Industrial Production", in: "Izvestia" (News), September 28th., 1965, in: M.E. Sharpe (Ed.): op cit., Volume 2; p. 29).

"Prices must, to the greatest possible degree, approximate the socially necessary outlays of labour".

(V. Garbuzov: "Finances and Economic Stimuli", in: "Ekonomicheskaya gazeta" (Economic Gazette), No. 41, 1965, in: M.E. Sharpe (Ed.): op. cit., Volume 2; p. 51).

"The strengthening of economic methods of planning... call for the closest possible approximation of prices to the socially necessary labour expenditures".

(N.K. Baibakov: "Tasks of Economic planning in the New Conditions", in: "Pravda" (Truth), October 29th., 1965, in: M.E. Sharpe (Ed.): op. cit., Volume 2; p. 100).

"Prices should come as close as possible to the level of socially necessary outlays of labour"

(E.G. Liberman: "Profitability of Socialist Enterprises", in: "Ekonomicheskaya gazeta" (Economic Gazette), No. 51, 1965, in: M.E. Sharpe (Ed.): op. cit., Volume 2; p, 229).

The new State Committee for Prices, established under the "economic reform", was charged with elaborating a new system of wholesale prices,

"...basing its decisions on the need to bring prices as close as possible to levels of socially necessary outlays of labour".

(A.N. Kosygin: ibid.; p. 30).

In other words, the price of a commodity was to be based on the "equilibrium price", the price which the commodity would have in a competitive market under conditions where supply corresponded to effective demand:

"The so-called 'equilibrium' price principle... presupposes the establishment of prices at a level that will guarantee the necessary corrrespondence between supply and demand... The equilibrium price as an element in the market economy becomes a very important and effective means of regulating the social production process... The equilibrium price principle... is a concrete expression of the law of supply and demand".

(A. Levin: "The Market in the System of Socialist Reproduction: The Equilibrium Price Principle", in: "Nauchnye doklady vysshei shkoly: Ekonomicheskie nauki" (Scientific Reports of Higher Schools: Economic Science), No. 1, 1969, in: "Problems of Economics", Volume 12, No. 7, November 1969; p. 39-40).

In his analysis of a competitive capitalist economy, Marx defined the price of production of a commodity as its cost of production plus average profit:

"The price of production of a commodity is equal... to its cost price plus the average profit".

(K. Marx: op. cit., Volume 3; p. 157).

and established that the price of production of a commodity tended to approximate to its value:

"In the case of capitals of average, or approximately average composition the price of production is... the same, or almost the same, as the value... All other capitals, of whatever composition, tend towards this average under pressure of competition".

(K. Marx: op. cit., Volume 3; p. 174).

Thus, Marx held that the price of production of a commodity tended to be merely a converted form of its value:

"The tendency necessarily prevails to make the prices of production merely converted forms of value".

(K. Marx: op. cit., Volume 3; p. 173-4).

Contemporary Soviet economists endorse Marx's formulation on this question:

"In an economy of developing commodity production, value is transformed into the price of production.... The latter is only a transformed form of value".

(V. Diachenko; "A Lever of Economic Stimulation", in: "Ekonomicheskaya gazeta" (Economic Gazette), No. 45, 1965, in; M.E. Sharpe (Ed.): op. cit., Volume 2; p. 126).

"The price of production corresponds to the socially necessary labour outlays, to the actual value of the product".

(L. Vaag: "According to a Single Rate of Profit", in: ibid.; p. 144).

Hence, in the propaganda campaign preceding and associated with the "economic reform", the demand that the prices of commodities should be brought into line with their values was also put forward in the form of the demand that these prices should be brought as closely as possible into line with prices of production:

"The author's (i.e., Liberman's -- WBB) ideas lead to the conclusion that the methodological basis of price formation in a planned socialist economy should be the price of production, which is characteristic of the capitalist system of economy".

(A. Zverev: "Against Over-Simplification in Solving Complex Problems", in: "Voprosy ekonomiki" (Problems of Economics), No. 11, 1962, in; M.E. Sharpe (Ed.): op. cit., Volume 1; p. 148).

"Marx provided an analysis of the commodity as a product of capitalist production, and he showed that the price of such a commodity is determined not by value directly, but by its modified form -- the price of production. An analysis of commodities as products of socialist production leaves no doubt that their prices must be fixed... by the 'price of production formula'".

(L. Leontiev: ibid.; p. 211-2).

"The system of price formation should be based on prices of production".

The need to bring the price of commodities into the closest possible equivalence with their values or prices of production was the official reason for the general "reform" of wholesale prices of industrial products put into effect on July 1st., 1967. By this measure, wholesale prices were raised by an average of 8% in industry as a whole, and by an average of 15% in heavy industry. (L. Maizenberg: "Improvements in the Wholesale Price System", in: "Vorosy ekonomiki" (Prolems of Economics), No. 6, 1970, in: "Problems of Economics", Volume 13, No. 10; February 1971; p. 46).

Some wholesale prices were raised in this "reform" by large amounts -- for example, that of coal by 78%, (V. Sitnin: "Wholesale Prices; Results and Tasks", in: "Ekonomicheskaya gazeta" (Economic Gazette), No. 6, 1968, in: "Problems of Economics", Volume 11, No. 5; September 1968; p. 27).

The wholesale price "reform" was stated to have the aim of creating conditions under which each normally functioning industrial enterprise could function "profitably":

"The wholesale price reform... was intended to create conditions for profitable work in all branches of industry and each normally functioning enteprise".

(V. Sitnin: ibid.; p. 26).

Soviet economists declared the "reform" to have been successful in this aim:

"These basic aims of the (wholesale price -- WBB) reform have been accomplished".

(V. Sitnin: ibid.; p. 26).

In fact, the wholesale price "reform" raised the rate of industrial profit 5-7% higher than had been officially envisaged:

"The planning of the new wholesale prices put into effect on July 1, 1967 was based on the projection that industry-wide profitability would be approximately 15%. In fact, however, in 1968 if proved to be 20.1%, and in the case of enterprises operating under the new system of planning and economic incentive it was 22.2%."

Sher; "Long-term Credit for Industry", in: "Voprosy ekonomiki" (Problems of Economics), No. 6, 1970, in: "Problems of conomics", Volume 13, No. 8; December 1970; p. 47).

Since the retail prices of consumer goods were not raised, however, enterprises engaged in the retail distribution of industrial consumer goods suffered -- and have continued to suffer -- a fall in their rate of profit:

"In retail establishments average profits (as a percentage of total sales) were.. in 1972, 1.88%".

(A.A. Be.lov: "Trade in the USSR", in: "The Soviet Planned Economy"; Moscow, 1974; p. 197).

But the wholesale price "reform" was only the first step in the "economic reform" in relation to prices. The aim of bringing about the social regulation of production by means of the market, through the profit motive, required that prices should fluctuate according to the varying relation between supply and effective demand on the market.

Accordingly, in the propaganda campaign preceding and associated with the "economic reform", the demand was also put forward that prices should be "more flexible":

"Price formation... should be more flexible".

(I. Kasitsky: "The Main Question: Criteria for Premiums and Indices Planned for Enterprises", in; "Voprosy eknomiki" (Problems of Economics), No. 11, 1962, in: M.E. Sharpe (Ed.): op. cit., Volume 1; p. 139).

"The need for flexible and dynamic price formation is dictated by a number of tasks".

(L. Leontiev: ibid.; p. 211).

"The stimulating role of profit presupposes more flexible prices"

(G. Kosiachenko: "The Plan and Cost Accounting", in: "Finansy SSSR" (USSR Finances), No. 12, 1964, in: M.E. Sharpe (Ed.): op. cit., Volume 1; p. 245).

"A big role will be played.. by more flexible planning of prices...Disregard for the law of demand and supply exerts a negative effect on the economy"..

(L. Gatovsky: "Unity of Plan and Cost Accounting", in; "Kommunist" (Communist), No. 15, 1965, in: M.E. Sharpe (Ed.): op. cit., Volume 2; p. 89).

"In fixing prices in a planned manner in a socialist economy, the changes in market conditions must be taken into account. If, for instance, retail prices fail to reflect changes in market conditions, they cannot serve as an instrument of a planned economic policy".

(L. Konnik: "Planning and the Market", in: "Voprosy ekonomiki" (Problems of Economics), No. 5, 1966, in: "Problems of Economics", Volume 5, No. 8; December 1966; p. 27).

It was made clear, in fact, that the demand for "more flexible" prices meant that prices should be fixed by enterprises themselves in accordance with their estimate of supply and effective demand on the market:

"It (i.e., the enterprise -- WBB) should be given the right to fix the price with the agreement of the customer".

(V. Belkin & I. Berman: "The Independence of the Enterprise and Economic Stimuli", in: M.E. Sharpe (Ed): op. cit., Volume 1; p. 229).

"Measures to increase the flexibility.. of price formation have also been adopted recently... According to these methods, enterprises themselves change prices of their output...

Enhancement of the role of the consumers in forming prices... will make it possible... further to extend the rights of enterprises in price formation. This will make prices even more flexible."

(P.G. Bunich: "Methods of Planning and Stimulation", in: "Soviet Economic Reform: Progress and Problems"; Moscow; 1972; p. 43).

The difficulty of reconciling this conception with the fiction that centralised economic planning, including price control, was being "maintained", was solved by Soviet propagandists by presenting the central "planning organs" as issuing "price norms", while leaving enterprises to fix their own "concrete prices":

"It is essential to incorporate extensively the normative method of establishing prices in the practice of price formation. The essence of this method is the centralised confirmation of base prices and their norms.. and the establishment of concrete prices by enterprises or associations themselves".

(A. Komin: "Problems in the Methodology and Practice of Planned Price Formation", in "Planvoe khoziaistvo" (Planned Economy), No. 9, 1972, in: "Problems of Economics", Volume 16, No. 1; May 1973; p. 47).

Naturally, these "concrete prices" often departed fundamentally from the "price norms" issued by the central "planning organs":

"Experience in the elaboration of the prospective development of the national economy until 1980, and of five-year plans existing (at the time of the elaboration) prices, has shown that subsequent price revisions fail to maintain the continuity of long-range and current plans not only with respect to targets in terms of value but also with regard to general value proportions".

(V. Kotov: "Prices: The Instrument of National Economic Planning and the Basis of the Value Indices of the Plan", in: "Planovoe khoziaistvo" (Planned Economy), No. 9, 1972, in: "Problems of Economics", Volume 16, No. 1; May 1973; p. 68).

On this basis, Soviet economists admitted that "centralised economic planning" -- even as a totalisation of the economic plans of individual enterprises -- was virtually impossible:

"As a result of the practice of making partial changes in price -- a practice that has become established in the last few years -- higher-echelon economic organs could not correctly plan"

(I. Usatov: "The Elaboration of Plans and the System of Prices", in: "Nauchnye doklady vysshei shkoly: Ekonomicheskie nauki" (Scientific Reports of Higher Schools; Economic Science), No. 8, 1972, in: "Problems of Economics", Volume 15, No. 11; March 1973; p. 54).

"It is practically impossible to compile a five-year plan while.. accounting for changes in wholesale prices. At a time when the national economy has not mastered new wholesale prices, it is extremely difficult to compile such a plan from the standpoint of the potential of modern methodology".

(A. Komin: ibid.'; p. 48).

Soviet economists were therefore set the task of forecasting indeterminate price levels

Babynin & R. Belousov: "Forecasting Wholesale Prices", in: "Voprosy ekonomiki"

(Problems of Economics), No. 4, 1971, in: "Problems of Economics", Volume 14, No. 5; September 1971; p. 42-59).

and of predicting rates of profit on the basis of indeterminate price trends:

(L. Veger: "Calculating Ecnoomic Effectiveness under Conditions of Indeterminacy", in: "Voprosy ekonomiki" (Problems of Economics), No. 2, 1972, in: "Problems of Economics", Volume 15, No. 4; August 1972; p. 41-62).

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