Diplomatic ties of Kyiv Rus

Diplomatic traditions in the Ukrainian lands date back many years ago. They are connected with establishment and development of Kyiv Rus state. As historical sources tell us, Kyiv Rus was a significant part of world history. It played a considerable role in formation of political map of medieval Europe.

Map of the Kievan Rus' in the 11th century. During the Golden Age of Kiev, the lands of Rus'covered modern western Ukraine, Belarus, and western Russia. But it did not include modern central, eastern, and southern Ukraine, which were inhabited by nomads and had a different history.

Kyiv Rus, together with the Empire of Charles the Great, belonged to the most significant and historically productive subjects of the early European Middle Ages. It was the primary center of civilization in the Eastern part of the continent. Having established itself as a European state in 11 th - 12 th centuries, it developed comprehensive ties not only with Byzantium and Southern Slavs, but with the Western European countries as well. Researchers (including Western ones) say that Rus, being located on the most important trade routes of that time, included several new key trade and economy centers, which arose after collapse of those located on the shores of the Mediterranean (and established in the late Ancient period). The Black and Baltic Seas were important in the new system of trade routes together with the route "from Varangians to Greeks", which connected them. That route crossed the Russian lands. One of the most important land routes led from Kyiv to the West, through Krakow and Prague, to the Southern Germany and the city of Regensburgh - an important trade center of that time, located on Danube. Volga played a considerable role as well, because it included trade route to the Central Asia. Therefore, Rus, being located on the crossing of important trade routes, was connected "with all parts of the world".

Kyiv Rus' international ties considerably grew and strengthened after introduction of Christianity. Kyiv established relations with many countries of Central Europe as an equal and full-fledged member of Christian community. In the end of 12 th century Rus had no mighty enemies who would present a considerable military or political danger for it. A chronicle tells that [prince] Volodymir Svyatoslavovitch "lived in peace with neighboring princes - with Boleslav Polish and with Stephan Hungarian and with Andrich (Idalrich) Czech - there was peace and love between them".

International relations of Kyiv state are reflected in treaties concluded by Kyiv princes with the neighboring states. There are three such treaties remaining - concluded with the Greeks by princes Oleg (in 911), Igor (in 945) and Svyatoslav (in 971), but the historical sources mention other treaties with Byzantium and Volga Bulgars.

Inter-dynasty marriages represent a noteworthy component of that-time diplomacy. Indeed, though our ancestors knew the policy of strength, the policy of sword, they strived to achieve peace, conclude agreements and reach understanding with other peoples - inter alia, by building their "foreign policy" on marriage grounds.

Political relations were reinforced with matrimonial alliances. Great Russian prince Volodymir Svyatoslavovitch is considered the first Russian prince to link himself with rulers of other countries. However, historians tell that Princess Olga -the wife of Kyiv prince Oleg - was, in fact, a Bulgarian princess named Elena. If this is true, then Volodymir's grandfather - prince Igor - has priority. Boleslav the Courageous, a Polish prince, sought a marriage with Volodymir's daughter Predslava. Boleslav's successor was married to another Volodymir's daughter, Maria. Greatest success in this field, though, was achieved by Yaroslav the Wise, called "the father-in-law of Europe". Thus, his youngest daughter Anastasia was married to Hungarian king Andrew, the oldest, Elizabeth - to a famous Norwegian king Harold Hardrad and yet another Yaroslav's daughter, Hanna, became a queen of France. Yaroslav himself was married to Ingigerda - the daughter of Swedish king Olaf.

Researchers estimate the total number of inter-dynasty marriages of Russian princes and princesses since the end of 10 th until the end of 12 th century to exceed one hundred. More than 30 of those were Russian-Polish marriages, Russian-Polovets ranked second (over 15), followed by Russian-Hungarian, Russian-Byzantium and Russian-German - all over ten. There were several Russian-Georgian, Russian-Swedish, Russian-Osetin, Russian-Bulgarian, Russian-Danish, Russian-Lithuanian, Russian-Norwegian marriages and single Russian-English, Russian-French, Russian-Austrian and Russian-Croatian marriages.

The above data demonstrate that Rus was considerably interconnected with the Western Europe in its political life. In any case, those dynastic connections, together with participation of Kyiv Rus in European diplomatic combinations, coalitions and wars, demonstrate that at that time Rus was a part of European political system and that it identified itself as a part of this system. Kyiv Rus lived an intense international life, and its foreign policy of 11 th and 12 th centuries was mostly "westward movement of a great European state".

In the centuries following the Mongol invasion, much of Ukraine was controlled by Lithuania (from the 14th century on) and since the Union of Lublin (1569) by Poland, as seen at this outline of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth as of 1619.

"Reply of the Zaporozhian Cossacks to Sultan Mehmed IV of the Ottoman Empire." Painted by Ilya Repin from 1880 to 1891.

Kyiv Rus' decline in the following period (13 th century - first half of 17 th century), caused by princely atomism, Tatar-Mongol invasion and annexing of considerable territories by Lithuania and Poland, left no possibilities for establishment of an independent Ukrainian state and respective foreign policy, despite certain attempts to restore former grandeur (Galytch-Volyn principality).

PART II

Diplomacy of "Cossack state"

The next step in development of national diplomacy was made in several centuries. It was connected with the national revolution within the Ukrainian lands, which started in winter 1648 by a Cossack uprising at the Zaporizhzhya Sitch. The revolution led to establishment of a new political unit at the European map - the Ukrainian state (or the Zaporizhzhya Host). Its emergence caused considerable changes in region's geopolitical situation. Ukraine, which used to be an object of international policy, became its important subject. Bogdan Khmelnitsky, the most prominent Cossack commander, statesman and diplomat, was a champion of the national idea of combat for state independence. Bohdan Khmelnytsky

Hetman of Ukraine

In office 30 January 1648 – 6 August 1657 Preceded by Dmytro Hunia Succeeded by Yurii Khmelnytsky

Even before the liberation struggle of 1648-1657 Bogdan Khmelnitsky was well acquainted with the European political situation and realized Ukraine's place within it. He gained international experience in the Zaporizhzhya Host, due to the fact that Cossacks had always strived to conduct their own foreign policy, independent of that of the Retch Pospolita (Poland). Already being a military clerk, in 1637 he not only managed military chancellery, but also was in correspondence with other states and conducted negotiations with foreign envoys (he was called a Chancellor in Europe).

The urgent need for allies in combat against the Retch Pospolita and for guarantees of existence of the new state caused outstandingly active foreign policy of Hetman's government. L. Kubanya, a Polish researcher, stated that "it seemed that there was not a single day when Khmelnitsky failed to meet foreign envoys, diplomatic agents, couriers and messengers and to send his own ones".

Bogdan Khmelnitsky managed to find optimal solutions, conclude alliances with some countries and neutralize other, utilizing the struggle between various countries and political forces of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. Due to those circumstances, he won recognition of Ukraine by the governments of Ottoman Empire, Crimean Khanate, England, Venice, Russia, the Retch Pospolita, Transylvania, Austria, Moldova, Valakhiya and Sweden.

At the same time, after profound and continuous analysis of international situation, he came to distressing conclusion that none of the states was interested in existence of independent Ukraine. Its establishment, on one hand, and severe weakening of the Retch Pospolita, on the other hand, could distort the balance of forces in the Eastern, Southeastern and Central Europe that came into existence after Thirty-years War.

Within this context of development of geopolitical processes, Bogdan Khmelnitsky faced a dilemma: to be left alone against the Retch Pospolita, an probably, to lose all major gains, or to seek protection of a strong power to preserve those gains. Such powers could be only Ottoman empire or Russia. Unfortunately, there was no other way out from the tragic geopolitical situation for the Ukrainian state.

After painful considerations, Hetman decided in favor of protection of Moscow Tsar. Naturally, it was a forced move, caused by 1653 Kamyanets Polish-Crimean Treaty, which demonstrated political understanding between the Retch Pospolita and Crimean Khanate and did not stipulate even for autonomy of Cossack state within the Retch Pospolita.

Analysis of Ukraine's foreign policy after conclusion of 1654 Pereyaslav and Moscow Treaties leads to conclusion that combat against the Retch Pospolita remained the priority task. At the same time, two waves of political regrouping in the Central and Eastern Europe, namely Crimean accession to the camp of Polish allies and Swedish declaration of war against Poland, created brand new geopolitical reality. Ukrainian-Russian offensive operations under 1654 treaty became the main method of achievement of goals set by the Ukrainian leadership. At the same time, diplomatic contacts with Ottoman Empire and Danube principalities were activated to ensure safety of the southern borders. Indirect pressure through Istanbul and military blockade by southern regiments, Zaporizhzhya and Don Cossacks and Kalmyks who served Russian Tsar were used against Crimea. The course of military cooperation with Sweden was considered one of priorities of Ukraine's foreign policy. At the same time, Swedish military successes complicate the situation in the region even more. Easiness of those victories together with their social and political background (voluntary recognition of king Karl 10 th Gustav's protection by Polish gentry) complicated Ukraine-Swedish dialogue and led to several Swedish ultimatums regarding limitation of Cossack zone of influence. This conflict of interests against the background of strains in Ukrainian-Russian relations and Crimean invasion in the Southern Ukraine caused withdrawal of Ukrainian armies from the Galichina.

At the same time, the Swedish factor made possible renewal of alliance between Ukraine and Crimea. Having concluded an agreement with Khan, Khmelnitsky attempted to introduce bipolar model of Ukraine's foreign orientation: establishment of alliance with Crimea and preservation of Moscow Tsar's protection.

The history of relations between Zaporizhzhya Cossacks and Crimean Tatars shows that periods of fight between them were often followed by political and economic cooperation.

In the 17 th century, this was often caused by foreign policy factors. In particular, peace treaties concluded between the Russian state and Ottoman Empire caused radical changes in political relations between the Zaporizhzhya Sitch and Crimean Khanate. Thus, a biennial truce was concluded in 1699 in Croatian town of Karlovitchi. The truce stipulated that military actions, robbery and pillage at the borders of the two states should be stopped, and violators of peace agreements be punished.

The representatives of Russia and Turkey touched upon several questions regarding the Zaporizhzhya Sitch and Crimean Khanate during their negotiations in Constantinople. In particular, the problem of existence of town-fortresses on the Dnipro, which were captured by Russian and Ukrainian armies in late 17 th century, was discussed. The issue of leaving the lands between the Zaporizhzhya Sitch and Ochakov empty and unsettled was also discussed.

Constantinople Peace Treaty (designed for 30 years) was signed in July 1700. Cossacks and Tatars were forbidden to fight on pain of death. In case of conflicts between them, all problems were to be settled through negotiations between border officials, and considerable problems were to be settled by letters between Moscow and Constantinople.

The peace, which was necessary for both Moscow and Constantinople to settle their domestic and foreign problems, caused serious worrying about Cossack's future. Cossacks realized that if the peace treaty were implemented, there would be no need for the Zaporizhzhya Host, which formally served the Russian Tsar and carried war against the Turks and Tatars for payment. It was obvious that Moscow gained strength, and there could be a moment in the future, when the Sitch, with its democratic traditions, would stand in the way of further Russian aggression.

Khmelnitsky's plans to create anti-Turkey alliance of the European states (including Ukraine, Russia and Sweden) can be viewed as a kind of maximum program of Ukrainian foreign policy. This would ensure international recognition of the Ukrainian state and prevented the forces of the main subjects of geopolitical balance of the Central and Eastern Europe from interference into Ukraine's affairs.

However, those plans were brought to an end with Khmelnitsky's death in 1657.

Though the leader of Cossack state failed to revive the Kyiv state of times of Olga and Svyatoslav, the Hetman managed to create Ukrainian autonomy, a quasi-state, which existed until 1764. Khmelnitsky's undisputable achievements are also serious reform of social system and legal consolidation of the state system.

Khmelnitsky was succeeded by others. The period of hetmanship of Yu. Khmelnitsky, Ya. Somko, I. Bryukhovetsky, D. Mnogogrishny, P. Doroshenko, M. Khanenko, and, partly, I. Samoylovich came to an end with fall of Chygyrin in 1678. It was a period of atomism and hardships for Ukraine.

The attempts to establish Cossack state at the left bank (under Russian protectorate) and at the right bank of the Dnipro failed to achieve noticeable results. This period lasted at the right bank of the Dnipro until 1702, when a revolt headed by S. Paliy was stifled. At the left bank of the Dnipro it came to an end with the beginning of the Northern War of Russian against Sweden.

The period of 1720-1724 saw expansive elimination of Cossack autonomy by Peter the Great. The Russian

Tsar introduced the same policy of "swallowing", which was conducted by Poland. That is why rebellions headed by I. Mazepa and later on, by P. Orlik, were Cossack's natural reaction.

The period of rule of the Malorossiskaya Collegium started with death of P. Polubotok and imprisonment of his followers. Peter the Great conducted elimination of Cossack state using Polish scheme, but with more ruthless and brutal methods. This process lasted until 1727, i.e. until restoration of Hetmanship.

Despite the attempts by Hetmans D. Apostol (1727) and K. Rozumovsky (1764) to reanimate the Cossack state, it kept on agonizing. Diplomatic war led by Pylyp and Grygor Orliks from abroad against Russia and their attempts to organize anti-Russian coalition of European states, thus enabling restoration of the Cossack state and ensuring its freedom and independence, failed as well. Tsars' protectorate over the Zaporizhzhya Sitch stripped P. Orlik from military foundation of his plans. This period was finished by the fall of Cossack state.

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