God is the Only Substance

The first step in Spinoza's argument for pantheism is to prove Proposition 5 that two substances cannot share the same attribute. The only way to distinguish two substances is by noting differences in their attributes or differences in their modes. Suppose, though, that two substances had the same attributes, but different modifications. For example, suppose there were two universes in which both were three-dimensional (i.e. same attribute) but one had trees and the other did not (i.e. differing modes). Spinoza argues that these differences in modification are not relevant. A substance has its own identity before it is modified. That is, the universe is what it is before it has trees or not. Thus, the only properties which truly distinguish one substance from another are broad attributes, not narrow modes. Thus, if two universes have precisely the same attributes, then they are the same universe.

Spinoza's next task is to prove the existence of God (Proposition 11). The central premise in his argument is Proposition 7: existence belongs to the nature of substance. He concedes that readers may have difficulty in comprehending Proposition 7. We see natural objects such as trees come into and go out of existence, and we assume that substances also come into and go out of existence. Spinoza argues that we would not make this confusion if we kept in mind the difference between modes and substances. Modes, such as properties of trees, do indeed come and go out of existence. Spinoza continues noting that we can also conceive of non-existent modes such as the properties of a unicorns. Again, though, we cannot conceive of a non-existent substance. Continuing with background material for his proof of God, Spinoza argues that an absolutely infinite substance has infinite attributes, each of which must be conceived through itself. Having made these points, Spinoza offers his proof for God:

Prop. XI. God, or substance, consisting of infinite attributes, of which each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality, necessarily exists.
Proof. -- If this be denied, conceive, if possible, that God does not exist: then his essence does not involve existence. But this (by Prop. vii.) is absurd. Therefore God necessarily exists....

Spinoza's proof is an ontological argument in the style of Anslem's and Descartes'. Like Anselm, Spinoza gives his argument in the form of a reductio ad absurdum:

1. (a) The idea of God is that of substance with infinite attributes, each of which is eternally and infinitely essential (Def. 6)

2. (b) Suppose that God does not exist

3. (c) Then existence is not part of his essence

4. (d) However, existence belongs to the nature of a substance

5. (e) Therefore, God exists

More simply, his argument is that God exists since (a) God is a substance, and (b) existence belongs to the nature of a substance. Spinoza continues by giving three additional proofs for God's existence (which will not be explored here). All four proofs are based on the common notion that God's existence necessarily follows from his nature.

Having proved that (a) no two substances can have the same attributes (Proposition 5), and (b) God exists with infinite attributes (Proposition 11), Spinoza proceeds to conclude that God is the only substance (Proposition 14). Again, The proof for this is as follows:

1. (a) There cannot exist in the universe two or more substances having the same nature or attribute (Proposition 5)

2. (b) God (defined as a substance consisting of infinite attributes, of which each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality) necessarily exists (Proposition 11)

3. (c) Therefore, besides God, no substance can be granted or conceived (Proposition 14).

Spinoza continues by making clear that Proposition 14 implies pantheism.

• Corollary I -- Clearly, therefore: 1. God is one, that is (by Def. vi.) only one substance can be granted in the universe, and that substance is absolutely infinite, as we have already indicated (in the note to Prop. x.).
• Corollary II. -- It follows: 2. That extension and thought are either attributes of God or (by Ax. i.) accidents (affectiones) of the attributes of God.
• Prop. XV. Whatsoever is, is in God, and without God nothing can be, or be conceived.

If all things are part of God, then the three-dimensional universe itself is part of God. This means that, in some sense, God has a body. However, Spinoza criticizes those who anthropomorphize the nature of God's body by maintaining that it is finite, and even susceptible to having emotions (given the fact that human emotions are the result of a human body). Spinoza harshly rejects both of these limitations on God's physical nature. However, the vast majority of western philosophers reject the notion that God has a three-dimensional body of any sort. He presents two traditional criticisms of the view that God has a body. First, there are absurdities involved when we consider quantity to be infinite. For example, one foot has twelve times the infinite number of points that one inch does. Second. God is active, and divided matter is passive. The two are thus incompatible. In response, Spinoza argues that the key error in all of these arguments is the assumption that extended substance is composed of parts. Instead, he maintains that the notion of extended substance must be drawn from the more foundational notion of infinite quality, and infinite quality cannot be measured.

In the remainder of Part I of the Ethics, Spinoza derives various properties of God. He summarizes these properties in the opening paragraph of the Appendix to Part I.

Appendix. In the foregoing I have explained the nature and properties of God. I have shown that (1) he necessarily exists, (2) that he is one, (3) that he is, and acts solely by the necessity of his own nature, (4) that he is the free cause of all things, and how he is so, (5) that all things are in God, and so depend on him, that without him they could neither exist nor be conceived, and (6) that all things are predetermined by God, not through his free will or absolute fiat, but from the very nature of God or infinite power. I have further, where occasion offered, taken caret to remove the prejudices which might impede the comprehension of my demonstrations. Yet there still remain misconceptions, not a few which might and may prove very grave hindrances to the understanding of the ordering of things, as I have explained it above. I have therefore thought it worth while to bring these misconceptions before the bar of reason.

The principal misconception about God that Spinoza wants to address in the Appendix is that God acts purposefully and directs events in nature towards a definite goal. For Spinoza, God does not do this.

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